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COMPETING WITH DELAWARE: RECENT AMENDMENTS
TO OHIO’S CORPORATE STATUTES
David Porter*
In October 2006, Ohio House Bill 3011 became law, amending
Ohio’s corporation and other business entity statutes as part of a
continuous effort to keep those statutes modern and to maintain Ohio’s
competitiveness as a business domicile. House Bill 301 is evolutionary,
not revolutionary, in its content, but its changes are nonetheless
significant for Ohio corporations and their lawyers. To place these
changes in context, this article summarizes corporate statutory
developments since 1997 that highlight Ohio’s previous initiatives to
keep up with Delaware, America’s dominant state of incorporation,2 and
then discusses at greater length the recent amendments contained in
House Bill 301, concluding with a look ahead at some additional
changes that may occur as early as this year.
A discussion of Ohio corporate law developments requires
introduction of the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar
Association (“OSBA”), an active organization of lawyers from around
the state who practice in the business entity field and who volunteer their
time to develop proposals for statutory change. The Committee, which
meets twice annually but operates throughout the year through active
subcommittees, is the primary source for Ohio legislation in the
corporate, limited liability company, and partnership field. Even
*

David Porter is a Partner in the Cleveland Office of Jones Day, and he serves as Vice Chair of the
Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association. The views expressed are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his Firm, the Committee, or his colleagues.
This article is derived in part from materials presented in seminars by the author on behalf of the
Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio State Bar Association. The author thanks his colleagues
Jeanne Rickert and Jennifer Lewis, as well as John C. Evans, a law student, who collaborated in the
preparation of some of those materials.
1. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). The text of the bill is available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=126_HB_301.
2. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004).
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legislative proposals in these fields developed by non-OSBA proponents
often evolve during the legislative process into bills that are primarily
the Committee’s work product before the Legislature adopts them.3
One of the invaluable services that the Corporation Law Committee
provides is the creation of official “Committee Comments” for
legislation that it originates. These comments, while not acts of the
Legislature and not prepared by the official drafting service support arm
of the Legislature, known as the Legislative Service Commission,4 are a
statement by experienced practitioners in the field as to what the
legislation is intended to do. As such, and because the more official
summaries of the Legislative Service Commission are produced by
persons less familiar with the corporate law arena, the Corporation Law
Committee’s comments are relevant to Ohio judges who are faced with
interpreting Ohio’s laws.5
One of the major tasks of the Corporation Law Committee is to
monitor developments in business entity law in other states, especially
Delaware. Delaware competes with the 49 other states to be a situs for
incorporations, and the franchise and filing fees it charges corporations
are a significant revenue generator for its government.6 That Delaware is
a successful competitor is demonstrated by the numbers: More than 50%
of publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated in
Delaware.7 In a 2003 survey, 216 members of the Fortune 500 were
incorporated in Delaware despite being headquartered elsewhere, and
3. See Thompson Hine.com, Changes to Ohio Law in Response to TRW/Northrop Takeover
Contest, http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/publication12.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
4. The Ohio Legislative Service Commission (LSC) is a nonpartisan agency providing
drafting, fiscal, research, training, and other technical and legislative services to the Ohio General
Assembly.
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, About LSC, http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/
about.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). In addition to revising legislative language for conformity to
its standards, the LSC also prepares analyses of each legislative bill for the benefit of the legislators.
Id. These analyses include bill analyses that explain, in relatively plain English, the language of the
bill as it progresses through each house, while fiscal analyses describe the fiscal impact of the bill.
Id. The Commission also prepares synopses of amendments to each bill as made by the various
legislative committees. Id. See also Ohio Legislative Service Commission Home Page,
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) for additional information.
5. See Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 206 N.E.2d 566, 569-70 (Ohio 1965). See also
Reynolds v. Wingers, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)(quoting from the
Corporation Law Committee comments).
6. Delaware Fiscal Notebook (2005), available at http://www.state.de.us/finance/
publications/fiscal_notebook_05/Section02/sec2page24.pdf. In 2005, franchise fees paid by
corporations and other entities to the State of Delaware generated $502 million, or over 17% of the
state’s general fund revenues. Id.
7. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 135. See also Feng Chen, Kenton Yee & Yong KeunYoo, Are
Delaware Firms Oranges? Fundamental Attributes and the Delaware Effect, 1ST ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=912942.
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the five next-most-successful states that compete for out-of-state
incorporations netted only 27 of the Fortune 500.8
In the 2003 survey, Ohio was the situs of the corporate headquarters
for 192, or 2.94%, of all U.S. publicly traded companies, but the state of
incorporation for only 112, or 1.72%.9 Ohio had corporate headquarters
for 21, or 5.68%, of the Fortune 500, but was the place of incorporation
for only 13, or 3.51%, of the Fortune 500.10 Nearly all Ohio-based
corporations that choose to be incorporated in another state are Delaware
corporations.11
The most commonly ascribed reasons for Delaware’s current
competitive success include the strength of its business court.12
Delaware uses a separate Court of Chancery that removes business entity
cases from the general litigation pool.13 Also there are tremendous
advantages to sharing experiences among the already large pool of
Delaware corporations. Legal experience from one Delaware corporation
is readily transferable to another Delaware corporation because they
operate under a common set of rules.14 These factors re-enforce one
another, as one commentator has said, “The quality of future case law
depends on the number and diversity of lawsuits brought before the
courts. These factors, in turn, depend on the number of firms
incorporated in the state.”15 As a result, Delaware’s corporate law
8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 556 (2002).
9. Id. at 566-67.
10. Id.
11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. &
ECON. 383, 392-393 (2003).
12. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 580.
13. The Delaware Division of Corporations’ website proclaims:
More than half a million business entities have their legal home in Delaware including
more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500.
Businesses choose Delaware because we provide a complete package of incorporation
services including modern and flexible corporate laws, our highly-respected Court of
Chancery, a business-friendly State Government, and the customer service oriented Staff
of the Delaware Division of Corporations.
State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s website goes so far as to proclaim:
The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely recognized as the nation’s preeminent forum
for the determination of disputes involving the internal affairs of the thousands upon
thousands of Delaware corporations and other business entities through which a vast
amount of the world’s commercial affairs is conducted. Its unique competence in and
exposure to issues of business law are unmatched.
First State Judiciary- Court of Chancery Welcome!, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Court%20of%20Chancery/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
14. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 586-88.
15. Id. at 586.
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(codified in the Delaware General Corporation Law, or “DGCL”) is
widely influential far beyond its borders.
I. 1997-2006 – A DECADE OF CHANGE
Since 1997, the Ohio Legislature, most often as the result of
initiatives from the OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee, has made
numerous changes to chapter 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code (the
“ORC”), sometimes called Ohio’s “General Corporation Law.” Many
basic features of Ohio corporate law—such as whether shareholders
have pre-emptive rights, whether directors may fix voting rights for
preferred shares, the means for shareholder and director
communications, and the creation or amendment of corporate
regulations and articles by directors—have been changed in fundamental
ways.16 Although a few of the changes during the period were intrinsic
to Ohio’s anti-takeover laws,17 which are very dissimilar to Delaware
law, most of the changes were directly responsive to the desire to keep
Ohio corporate law competitive with Delaware.18
The following chronology lists the most significant changes to
chapter 1701 from 1997 through 2006:

Year

Effect of Amendment
Amended provisions
of Ohio’s Control
Share Acquisition Act
in response to
questions raised in
litigation19

Ohio Statutory
Reference
Title 17, sections
1701.01(Z),
1701.831, and
1701.832 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Comparable Delaware
Provisions
N/A (Delaware has no
counterpart to the
Control Share
Acquisition Act)

1997

1998

Reduced minimum
size of board

Title 17, section
1701.63(A) of

Title 8, section 141(c) of
the Delaware Code

16. See infra pp. 5-11 for a chronology of changes.
17. See infra notes 19 and 36
18. See infra page 11 for a breakdown of legislative purposes.
19. H.B. 170, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997). The legislation responded to
questions raised by Judge Graham in United Dominion Industries, Ltd. v. Commercial Intertech
Corp, 943 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Ohio 1996). In that case, Judge Graham upheld the constitutionality
of 1990 amendments to Ohio’s Control Share Acquisition Act but invited changes, which were
subsequently implemented by the legislature. Id. at 862-64.
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committees from 3
directors to 120
Authorized use of
electronic proxies21

the Ohio Revised
Code
Title 17, section
1701.48 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Eliminated
requirement for a
statement of
corporation’s purpose
in the articles of
incorporation23

Title 17, section
1701.04 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Allowed board to fix
voting terms of blank
check preferred

Title 17, section
1701.06(A)(12)
of the Ohio

179

allows for single
director committees)
Title 8, section 212 of
the Delaware Code
authorized delivery of
proxies by electronic
communications22
Title 8, section
102(a)(3) of the
Delaware Code retains a
purpose clause
requirement comparable
to the former Ohio
provision24
Title 8, section
102(a)(4) of the
Delaware Code allowed

20. H.B. 579, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997).
21. H.B. 6, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). House Bill 6 is an example of a
legislative proposal originated by others that was amended by substituting language prepared by the
OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee covering the same topic. See Thomas Geyer, Sub H.B. 6
Authorizes Electronic Proxies and Makes Technical Changes to 1707, Ohio Securities Bulletin,
Issue 99:2, available at http://www.securities.state.oh.us/Bulletin/BUL992.pdf.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2006).
23. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999).
24. Title 8, section 102(a)(3) of the Delaware Code retains a requirement that the certificate of
incorporation recite:
The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted. It shall be sufficient
to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all
lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except for
express limitations, if any.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2006).
25. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). As stated in the Corporation Law
Committee’s comments on the legislation:
Previous law expressly permitted the directors, if authorized in the articles of
incorporation, to adopt amendments to the articles to fix or change certain of the terms of
a class or series of shares that had not yet been issued. However, previous law did not
permit the directors to determine the voting rights of a class or series, and it was not
clear whether it conferred upon directors the authority to determine whether or not
dividends would be cumulative or the relative preferences of a series or class of shares.
These limitations and uncertainties made [the existing provisions] of limited utility.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.06 cmt. (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment)
(reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 18
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shares25

Revised Code

Allowed directors to
create regulations for
new corporations26

Title 17, section
1701.10 of the
Ohio
Revised Code
Title 17, section
1701.15 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Eliminated statutory
pre-emptive rights in
new corporations27

2002

Authorized expanded
use of “cyberspace”
meetings of directors
and shareholders28

Title 17, sections
1701.11
(regulation
provisions on
meeting locus),
1701.40 (where
meetings can be
held), 1701.42
(waiver of
notices), 1701.51
(quorum for
shareholder
meetings),
1701.61 (director
meetings),
1701.62 (quorum
for director
meetings) of the
Ohio Revised
Code

[40:175

directors to fix voting
rights of preferred
shares
Title 8, section 109 of
the Delaware Code
allowed directors to
adopt bylaws
Title 8, section 102 of
the Delaware Code
provided that there were
no statutory pre-emptive
rights
Various sections of the
Delaware Code were
amended in 2000 to
contain similar
provisions29

(Michael A. Ellis ed 2005).
26. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999).
27. See id. The amendment sets a trap for the unwary practitioner: it maintains statutory preemptive rights for corporations organized prior to the bill’s effective date of March 17, 2000,
eliminating such rights for corporations organized on or after that date unless they opt into the new
regime. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.15(C) (West 2006). The trap is heightened by the failure of
generally available compilations of Ohio statutes to contain a copy of the historic provisions. See,
e.g., PAGE’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (LexisNexis); BALDWIN’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West).
28. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
29. S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999).
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Authorized expanded
use of electronic
communications
to/from shareholders30

Expanded authority of
the directors to amend
corporate articles to
(1) change the name of
the corporation, (2)
change its principal
place of business, (3)
increase the number of
shares to make or

Title 17, sections
1701.25 (express
terms of shares),
1701.37 (use of
email addresses),
1701.38
(delivery of
financial
statements),
1701.41 (notices
of meetings),
1701.54 (written
actions), 1701.69
(notice regarding
amendments to
the articles),
1701.80 and
1701.801
(notices
regarding
subsidiary/parent
mergers), and
additional
conforming
sections of the
Ohio Revised
Code
Title 17, sections
1701.70 (powers
to amend
articles) and
1701.73 (notice
to shareholder of
amendments) of
the Ohio Revised
Code

181

Various sections of the
Delaware Code were
amended in 2000 to
contain similar
provisions31

The Delaware Code has
no directly
corresponding
provisions33

30. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
31. S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999).
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reflect a stock
split/stock dividend32
Prohibited removal of
directors, without
cause, in an issuing
public company that
has a classified
board34
Authorized pre-filing
of articles of
incorporation to allow
selection of a future
incorporation date35
Amended provisions
of Ohio’s Control
Share Acquisition Act
in response to
questions raised in
litigation36
Provided limited
authority for directors
to amend existing
corporate regulations38

[40:175

Title 17, section
1701.11 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Title 8, section 141(k)
of the Delaware Code
prohibited removal of
directors on a classified
board without cause

Title 17, section
1701.04(E) of
the Ohio Revised
Code

Title 8, section 103(d)
of the Delaware Code
provided for pre-filing
of certificates of
incorporation
N/A (Delaware has no
counterpart to the
Control Share
Acquisition Act)

Title 17, sections
1701.01(Z) and
1701.831 of the
Ohio Revised
Code
Title 17, sections
1701.10 and
1701.11 (power
to amend) and
additional
sections to limit
power of the

Title 8, section 109 of
the Delaware Code
allowed delegation of
power to directors to
amend bylaws

32. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242. However, under title 28 section 253 of the Delaware Code,
Delaware directors can effect a name change for the corporation through a merger with a subsidiary
of which the corporation owns at least 90% of each class of outstanding shares.
34. S.B. 110, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). This bill is another example of
legislation that was originated by others but heavily modified through comments and substituted
language provided by the Corporation Law Committee. See Linda Wooden, Vice President of Gov’t
Affairs with the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Testimony on Sub. S.B. 110 (Oct. 17, 2001) available
at http://www.ohiochamber.com/governmental/testimonySB110.asp.
35. H. B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
36. H.B. 7, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg Sess. (Ohio 2001). The changes implemented were the
result of decisions by Judge Manos in Northrop Grumman Corp. v. TRW, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12905 (N.D. Ohio April 18, 2002).
37. All 2006 amendments are contained in H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2006).
38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.10(A) and 1701.11(A)(1) (West 2006). See infra notes
82-99 and accompanying text.
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Broadened the types of
consideration that can
be received for
shares39

Ohio Revised
Code
Title 17, sections
1701.18 and
1701.19 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Allowed subsidiary
spin-offs without a
shareholder vote41

Title 17, section
1701.76 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Permitted holding
company formations
without shareholder
vote42
Allowed conversions
into other forms of
entities43

Title 17, section
1701.802 of the
Ohio Revised
Code
Title 17, section
1701.801 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Clarified that directors
may delegate optiongranting authority to
officers44

Title 17, section
1701.17 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

Clarified that board
committees may
delegate their authority
to subcommittees45

Title 17, section
1701.63 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

183

Title 8, section 153 of
the Delaware Code was
amended in 2004 to
permit broader forms of
consideration in the
issuance of shares 40
Delaware Code
analogous provision,
Title 8, section 271,
does not apply to spinoffs by dividend
Title 8, section 251(g)
of the Delaware Code
permitted holding
company formations
Title 8, sections 265 and
266 of the Delaware
Code permitted
conversions into other
forms of entities
Title 8, section 157(c) of
the Delaware Code
provided for delegation
of option-granting
authority to officers
Title 8, section
141(c)(3) of the
Delaware Code
provided for delegation
to subcommittees

39. Id. §§ 1701.18; 1701.19. See also infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 326 (2004).
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2006). See also infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
42. Id. § 1701.802. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
43. Id. § 1701.801. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
44. Id. § 1701.17. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
45. Id. § 1701.63. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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Broadened the
corporate actions that
can be made pursuant
to an order of a federal
bankruptcy court46

Title 17, section
1701.75 of the
Ohio Revised
Code

[40:175

Title 8, section 303 of
the Delaware Code had
been amended in 2004
to the same effect47

An analysis of these 21 significant changes to Ohio’s corporation
law during the past decade breaks down as follows:
• Aligning Ohio more closely with Delaware:17
• Ohio anti-takeover provisions (no Delaware equivalent): 2
• Other divergences from Delaware: 2
The foregoing ratio of 17:2:2 is somewhat misleading, in that it
would give one a sense that Ohio slavishly follows Delaware in most
regards. That would somewhat overstate the situation, as many of the
Ohio provisions diverge in at least minor ways from choices made by
Delaware. What would be fair to say is that Ohio lawyers and legislators
have, in most areas, adapted concepts tested in Delaware to a uniquely
Ohio framework.
Not all developments in Delaware are viewed as necessary or
appropriate for Ohio.48 Nor does Ohio follow all of the developments in
the Model Business Corporation Act [hereinafter “MBCA”], created
under the auspices of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association.49 Both chapter 1701 and the DGCL, while
sometimes influenced by the MBCA, have evolved separately, leading to
a divergence in language, defined terms, and substantive content. This
divergence in style and content requires the Ohio practitioner who works
with both Delaware and Ohio corporations to stay keenly aware of the

46. Id. § 1701.75. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 326 (2006).
48. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Symposium:
Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley
Governance Issues: The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1763 n. 60 (2006).
49. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf. Some of the amendments adopted in H. B. 78 in 2000
reflected changes in the MBCA that were reviewed by the Corporation Law Committee and
proposed for adoption in Ohio. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). For example,
the elimination of the requirement for a corporate purpose clause in section 1701.04 follows the
guide of the MBCA—the Committee comment to that amendment says “Following the lead of the
[MBCA], the requirement of a statement of purpose has been deleted as being purely formalistic but
a statement is allowed by way of limitation.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04 cmt. (Ohio General
Corporation Law Committee comment) (reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP,
supra note 25, at 14-15).
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differences between the two states, as confusion can easily occur.
Although the changes outlined in the table above have reduced the
substantive differences between Ohio and Delaware corporate law in
many technical areas, there remains a fundamental difference between
the two states in their attitude toward corporate governance. Delaware
may – as is the case of Liberia or Panama when it comes to “flags of
convenience” for shipping—be looked upon as a “situs of convenience”
for incorporation by chartering corporations that have no real contact
with Delaware.50 Ohio’s corporations, on the other hand, are largely
native to its soil, are given their charter by the State for the benefit of the
State and its citizens, and still maintain sizable operations within the
state.51 The perceived connection between corporations that are
organized in Ohio, Ohio jobs, and the Ohio economy has led the Ohio
legislature to provide strong anti-takeover statutes to protect them.52 So
Ohio, in giving directors of Ohio corporations the discretion to consider
constituencies other than shareholders in making any decision,53 has
directly renounced some of the doctrines created by the Delaware Court
of Chancery that have arisen in takeover cases.54 And it has adopted
more favorable provisions in protecting directors against lawsuits55 and
in obtaining indemnification.56 Similarly, Ohio’s Legislature has,
through provisions such as the “anti-arbitrageur” language of the Control

50. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 136. Greenfield identified only two Fortune 500 companies
(one of which, MBNA, was subsequently acquired) actually headquartered in Delaware. Id. The
largest company then incorporated in Delaware, Wal-Mart (which is headquartered in Bentonville,
Arkansas), has more than double the number of employees than Delaware has residents, and
Delaware corporations’ employees in Delaware account for an infinitesimal fraction of those
corporations’ total employee base. Id.
51. See generally Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 11.
52. See supra notes 19 and 36 (highlighting Ohio’s anti-takeover statutes).
53. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(1) (West 2006). In contrast, Delaware provides that
corporate directors owe their fiduciary duties to shareholders, and obligations toward other
constituencies are excluded. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 137.
54. § 1701.59(C) (making clear that a director retains the benefit of the business judgment
rule even in a corporate takeover situation, thereby renouncing the “Unocal/Unitrin doctrine”
enunciated by the Delaware courts). See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
55. § 1701.59(D) (imposing the burden on a plaintiff to prove with ‘clear and convincing”
evidence that a director’s actions violate the statutory standards).
56. Id. § 1701.13(E)(5) (limiting the obligation of a director to return an advancement of costs
by requiring proof by “clear and convincing evidence . . . that his action or failure to act involved an
act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken
with deliberate disregard for the best interests of the corporation”). Coupled with the constituency
provisions and other protections of section 1701.59, this severely limits the circumstances under
which an advancement of funds would need to be repaid.
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Share Acquisition Act57 and the profit disgorgement provisions of the
Control Bid provisions of the state securities laws,58 sought to minimize
the impact of quick-buck seeking, short-term investors, thereby favoring
the interests of longer-term investors. At the same time, Ohio balances
these anti-takeover provisions with a shareholder-centric approach to
many fundamental corporate governance changes. For example, Ohio’s
statutes allow shareholders to amend the articles of incorporation59 or
regulations60 without board approval.
Thus the task for those who work on updating and refreshing
Ohio’s corporation laws is to try to eliminate mechanical differences
between the functioning of title 17, section 1701 of the Ohio Revised
Code and title 8 of the Delaware Code while maintaining the special
values inherent in Ohio’s laws. And that is precisely how the corporate
provisions of House Bill 301 came about.
II. HOUSE BILL 301
House Bill 301 contains ten substantive amendments to Title 17,
section 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code, that:
• Give directors authority to amend regulations, with some
limitations (existing corporations may need to opt into this
provision);61
• Allow spin-offs without a shareholder vote;62
• Permit holding company formations without a shareholder
vote;63
57. Title 17, section 1701.831 of the Ohio Revised Code, together with its associated
definitions contained in Section 1701.01, is commonly known as the Ohio Control Share
Acquisition Act. Section 1701.831(E) requires approval of a control share acquisition by holders of
a majority of the voting power in the election of directors (thus typically a majority of the
outstanding shares) and also holders of majority of that voting power excluding the voting power of
“interested shares.” Section 1701.01(CC)(1)(d), adopted in the 1990 amendments to the Act, added
to the definition of “interested shares” those shares held by persons who acquire “such shares for
valuable consideration beginning with the date of the first public disclosure of a proposal for, or
expression of interest in, a control share acquisition. . . .” As the most likely purchasers of shares in
this situation are arbitrageurs, the provision is commonly known as the “anti-arbitrageur provision.”
58. §§1707.041, 1707.42 and 1707.43 (West 2006) (control bid statutes). Section 1707.43, in
particular, can force disgorgement of profits by a person who announces a control bid but fails to
consummate the bid.
59. Id. § 1701.71.
60. Id. § 1701.11.
61. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.11 (A)(1)(d) (West 2006)).
62. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.76 (West 2006)).
63. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss1/5

12

Porter: Ohio's Changing Corporation Laws
PORTERFINAL.DOC

2007]

3/19/2007 12:23:14 PM

OHIO’S CHANGING CORPORATION LAWS

187

Allow conversions from one form of entity to another;64
Clarify that directors may delegate option grant authority to
officers;65
• Clarify that Board committees may create and delegate
their authority to subcommittees;66
• Allow SEC reports to serve as notice of Board-adopted
amendments to the articles;67
• Broaden the types of consideration for which shares and
limited liability membership interests may be issued;68
• Allow corporate actions to be taken by bankruptcy court
decree in liquidation proceedings as well as in
reorganizations;69 and
• Allow reliance on corporate good standing certificates for
up to seven days (helping to resolve legal opinion issues).70
In addition to these provisions amending Title 17, chapter 1701,
House Bill 301 includes amendments affecting limited liability
companies, partnerships and Ohio’s securities laws, that:
• Require notice to the Ohio Division of Securities of
material changes to tender offers; 71
• Allow regulations of the Ohio Division of Securities to
change automatically with SEC rule changes;72
• Limit the fiduciary duties of those who provide goods or
services to business entities73 in response to the decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court in Arpadi v. First MSP Corp.;74
•
•

§ 1701.802 (West 2006)).
64. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.782, 1701.792, 1701.811, and 1701.821 (West 2006)).
65. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.17(B)(1) (West 2006)).
66. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.63(G) (West 2006)).
67. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.73(A)(3) (West 2006)).
68. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.18(A)(1) (West 2006)).
69. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.75(A) (West 2006)).
70. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.92(D) (West 2006)).
71. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
72. See id.
73. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.921 (West 2006)).
74. 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994).
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and
• Clarify aspects of partnership law.75
The following discussion describes in more detail the corporate
entity provisions of House Bill 301. Although most of the provisions of
House Bill 301, including all of the corporate and securities provisions,
were developed with OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee,76 the
provisions of House Bill 301 that address Arpadi and clarified aspects of
partnership law were not changes proposed by the Corporation Law
Committee. This article does not address those provisions or the changes
to the securities laws.
A. Providing Directors With Authority To Amend Regulations
Ohio has long stood apart from other states by requiring any
changes to the regulations (called “bylaws” in Delaware and many other
states) to be approved by shareholders.77 Title 8, section 109 of the
Delaware Code allows directors to both adopt the initial regulations and,
if expressly authorized by the certificate of incorporation (as is the norm
in practice), to amend regulations.78 Ohio previously made a partial
adjustment toward the Delaware position by the 2000 amendments to
Title 17, section 1701.10 of the Ohio Revised Code that permitted
directors to adopt regulations for a newly organized corporation if done
so within 90 days of its organization.79
In the author’s experience, the Ohio approach of limiting the
directors’ authority regarding the regulations created significant, and
unnecessary, problems for Ohio corporations. For example, when the

75. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
76. David P. Porter, Jeanne M. Rickert, Randall M. Walters & Jennifer C. Lewis,
Amendments to Ohio’s Business Entity Statutes Effective in October 2006, JONES DAY
COMMENTARIES, http://www1.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3729.
77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.10 (Anderson 1996).
78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
79. The Corporation Law Committee’s comment to H. B. 78, recited:
Under Sections 1701.09 and 1701.19 as previously enacted, the only way to organize an
Ohio corporation was for the incorporators to issue shares, the shareholders to elect
directors and adopt regulations and the directors to elect officers. Following [Revised
Model Corporation Act] §2.05, Section 1701.10 has been revised to add alternative
methods of organization by allowing initial directors named in the articles to adopt
regulations and complete the organization of the corporation or allowing the
incorporators to select the initial directors who will complete the organization of the
corporation. Section 1701.10 retains the principle that after the organizational period,
regulations may be adopted or amended only by the shareholders.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.09 cmt (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment)
(reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, supra note 25, at 24).
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provisions of title 17, section 1701.48 of the Ohio Revised Code were
amended in 199980 to permit the use of internet, telephonic and other
means of transmitting proxies, many Ohio corporations were unable to
make use of the new authority granted by the Legislature because their
existing regulations included language that required proxies to be “by a
writing signed by [the shareholder],” paralleling the former statutory
language. Before using the new electronic proxy authority, the
corporation had to first go to its shareholders and amend the prior
regulations to eliminate the restriction. This meant that many public
companies, for whom the new authority potentially would mean
significant cost savings, were not only faced with a year’s delay in
reaping the benefits of the new statute, but also had their proxy process
made more difficult and costly for the year in which they sought the
amendment to the regulations due to a longer SEC process.81
In a change that reflects a compromise between retention of Ohio’s
historically shareholder-centric standards and a total shift to the boardcontrolled bylaws practices common in other states, House Bill 301
amended title 17, section 1701.11 of the Ohio Revised Code to give the
directors limited authority to amend corporate regulations.82 This
authority may be granted either by the shareholders or be contained in
original regulations adopted by the directors upon incorporation.83
Directors cannot, however, be authorized to amend provisions of the
regulations that:
• Specify the percentage of shares a shareholder must hold in
order to call a shareholders meeting;84
• Specify the length of the time period required for notice of
a shareholders meeting;85
• Specify that shares that have not yet been fully paid can
have voting rights;86
• Specify requirements for a quorum at a shareholders

80. See H.B. 6, 123rd General Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000).
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2006). The SEC requires the filing of a preliminary proxy
statement for proposals other than the election of directors, ratification of accountants or the
approval of benefit plans. Id. This typically extends the proxy process by more than a month,
requiring earlier preparation of proxy materials and risking additional SEC review.
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.10(A) and 1701.11(A)(1).
83. Id. § 1701.11 (A)(1)(d).
84. Id. § 1701.40(A)(3). The default percentage of outstanding shares a shareholder or group
of shareholders must hold in order to call a shareholders meeting is 25%, but can be modified to as
high as 50% by the articles or the regulations.
85. Id. § 1701.41(A).
86. Id. § 1701.44(B).
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meeting;87
• Prohibit shareholder or director actions from being
authorized or taken without a meeting;88
• Define terms of office for directors or provide for
classification of directors;89
• Require greater than a majority vote of shareholders to
remove directors without cause;90
• Establish requirements for a quorum at directors’ meetings,
or specify the required vote for an action of the directors;91
• Delegate authority to committees of the board to adopt,
amend or repeal regulations;92 or
• Remove the requirement that a control share acquisition of
an issuing public corporation be approved by shareholders
of the acquired corporation.93
These limitations restrict the directors’ ability to enact amendments
that could, in the view of the drafters within the Corporation Law
Committee who originated these provisions of House Bill 301,
significantly alter the fundamental power of the shareholders versus the
directors in corporations, or among shareholder groups.94 On the other
hand, directors can make amendments relating to important but primarily
ministerial or procedural issues, such as allowing the use of electronic
proxies, fixing the date and location of meetings, or requiring prior
87. Id. § 1701.51.
88. Id. § 1701.54(A).
89. Id. § 1701.57(A), (B).
90. Id. §§ 1701.57 and 1701.58(A).
91. Id. § 1701.62.
92. Id. § 1701.63.
93. Id. § 1701.831.
94. In presenting the proposals for approval by the Ohio State Bar Association’s Council of
Delegates, the Corporation Law Committee submitted the following statement:
In drafting the proposed amendments, the Corporation Law Committee was mindful of
the careful balancing between our State’s interest in competing with other states as a
corporate domicile and the need to facilitate corporate procedural change, versus our
State’s interest in preserving the rights of shareholders to control the governance of their
corporation and the current public concerns over corporate governance. Accordingly,
rather than merely extending to the Directors a broad right to amend corporate
regulations, the Committee has taken the approach that recognizes that certain matters
addressed in a corporation’s regulations are fundamental to the relationship between the
corporation and its shareholders, and should therefore require approval of the
shareholders for amendment. The amendments also clarify that the directors’ authority
to amend the regulations may not be exercised by an executive or other committee of the
board of directors.
Corporation Law Committee, Report and Recommendations to the Ohio State Bar
Association Council of Delegates Meeting (Jan. 21, 2005) (on file with author).
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notice of nominations or shareholder proposals.95 In no event can
directors make changes to regulations to restrict the shareholders’
authority to adopt, amend, or repeal regulations.96
Before relying on House Bill 301 to permit director amendment to
the regulations, an Ohio corporation should check its existing
regulations. Many will find that their regulations set forth amendment
provisions that recite the pre-House Bill 301 statutory standard that
limited amendments to those adopted by shareholders.97 Those
provisions must themselves be amended by shareholders to opt in to the
new authorization of director amendments. This outcome is intentional;
in addition to constitutional concerns about the power of the legislature
to modify existing regulations, the new authority for director
amendments is a major change from the status quo, and the drafters
believed an opt-in statute was appropriate.98 However, new corporations
may include provisions in their regulations to opt in to the new
provisions.99
B. Permitting Spin-Offs Without a Shareholder Vote
Spin-offs—the distribution by a parent company of the shares of a
subsidiary to the parent’s shareholders100—are popular capital market
transactions that allow a public corporation to become more focused on
its core competencies by separating unlike businesses or maximizing
shareholder value through higher valuations for the several independent
business parts as opposed to the consolidated whole. In most states, spinoffs do not require shareholder approval, no matter how large the
transaction is, as the concept of a dividend or distribution does not fall
within the “sale or lease of all or substantially all of the corporation’s

95. § 1701.11(B).
96. Id. The previous version of title 17, section 1701.11(B)(10) of the Ohio Revised Code
allowed regulations to define, limit or regulate the exercise of authority by the corporation,
directors, officers or all shareholders. The amendments remove shareholders from that group. Title
17, section 1701.11(B)(11) of the Ohio Revised Code permits regulations that define, limit or
regulate the exercise of authority by shareholders, but provides that regulations that change or
eliminate shareholder authority can only be adopted by shareholders.
97. See, e.g., supra note 78 (explaining the delay in SEC filings due to duplication of statutory
language in corporation regulations).
98. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (Committee Comments to section
1701.11).
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.15(C) (West 2006).
100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004) (defining spin-off as “[a] corporate
divestiture in which a division of a corporation becomes an independent company and stock of the
new company is distributed to the corporation’s shareholders”).
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assets” statutory provisions.101 In contrast, title 17, section 1701.76 of
the Ohio Revised Code applies to any “transfer, or other disposition of
all, or substantially all, of the assets . . . of a corporation” and therefore
can apply to a transfer by dividend or distribution of subsidiary shares.102
Few cases construe the Ohio statute, adding to the interpretative
difficulty. This has sometimes resulted in spin-offs being problematic for
lawyers advising Ohio corporations that seek to achieve a spin-off.
House Bill 301 amended title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio
Revised Code to allow an “issuing public corporation”103 to spin off a
subsidiary business to holders of shares in the issuing public corporation
without shareholder approval.104 Two exceptions could require
shareholder approval: first, if a spun-off entity is a party to an agreement
to engage in a subsequent transaction, such as a merger, that would, if
entered into following the spin-off, have required shareholder approval,
105
and second, if the issuing public corporation has more than one class
of shares outstanding immediately prior to the spin-off.106
The amendment to title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised
Code reflects the continuation of an interesting development in Ohio
corporate law: the differential treatment of corporations, in this case
based on the corporation meeting the requirements of being an “issuing
public corporation.” As defined in title 17, section 1701.01(Y) of the
Ohio Revised Code, this means “a domestic corporation with fifty or
more shareholders that has its principal place of business, its principal
executive offices, assets having substantial value, or a substantial
percentage of its assets within this state and as to which no valid close
101. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 271 (2004); CAL CORP. CODE § 1002 (West 2006)
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76(A) (West 2006).
103. “Issuing public corporation” is defined as:
a domestic corporation with fifty or more shareholders that has its principal place of
business, its principal executive offices, assets having substantial value, or a substantial
percentage of its assets within this state, and as to which no valid close corporation
agreement exists under division (H) of section 1701.591 [1701.59.1] of the Revised
Code.
§ 1701.01(Y).
104. Id. § 1701.76(G).
105. Id. § 1701.76(G)(1) as adopted in House Bill 301. Such a transaction might, for example,
be a “reverse Morris Trust transaction,” in which a spin-off of a subsidiary occurs followed
immediately by a merger of the spun-off entity with a third party. Robert Willens, Developments in
the Fields of Accounting and Tax, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 99, 103 (Spring 1999). An example of
such a transaction was the acquisition by the J.M. Smucker Company of the Jif-Crisco businesses of
Procter & Gamble Company in 2002. Kristina Buchthal, Fortune Brands Avoids Hefty Tax Bill in
Spinoff, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, March 17, 2005, available at http://chicagobusiness.com/cgibin/news.pl?id=15844&rel=1.
106. § 1701.76(G)(2).
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corporation agreement exists. . . .”107 So a public company incorporated
in Ohio, but lacking other meaningful connections to the state, will not
benefit from the amendment. And despite the reference to “public” in the
defined term, the company need not be a public reporting company
under the federal securities laws.108
The following examples illustrate how the new provisions of title
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code could affect three
differing spin-off situations:
Illustration 1: Company A, an issuing public corporation, owns all of
the shares of Company B and wants to distribute those shares to its
shareholders. Company A has a single class of shares, and there are no
existing commitments affecting Company B that would otherwise
require shareholder approval. With the effectiveness of House Bill
301’s amendment to title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised
Code, there need no longer be any inquiry into whether Company B
constitutes all or substantially all of Company A’s assets.
Illustration 2: The same facts as in Illustration 1, but Company A has,
in addition to its outstanding Class A (voting) common shares,
outstanding shares of Class B (non-voting) common shares. Since
there are two classes of shares outstanding, the relief from title 17,
section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code does not apply, and whether
or not Company B constitutes all or substantially all of Company A’s
assets must be tested.
Illustration 3: The same facts as in Illustration 1, but shortly before the
spin-off Company A, as sole shareholder of Company B, and
Company B have agreed with Company C (an unrelated third party)
that Company B will merge with and into a subsidiary of Company C.
As the merger with Company C would, if authorized after the spin-off,
require the approval of Company B’s shareholders, the relief from title
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code does not apply, and
whether or not Company B constitutes all or substantially all of
Company A’s assets must be tested.

C. Permitting Holding Company Formations without Shareholder
Approval
A holding company formation transaction is a transaction in which
a new parent corporation becomes the sole shareholder of an existing
107. Id. § 1701.01(Y).
108. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2006).
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company, typically by a merger process involving a third affiliated
corporation formed solely to effect the merger, and thereby moving the
shareholders of the old company to the new parent holding company as
the only shareholders of the parent.109 In essence, the shareholders are
moved up one tier in the corporation organizational chart, one step
further removed from the assets used in the business. This process is a
useful mechanism by which corporate lawyers facilitate the future
disposition of corporate assets, better match asset ownership with asset
management, or provide greater protection against liability exposure
between operating subsidiaries. Under amendments to DGCL §251(g)
adopted several years ago, the directors of Delaware corporations were
empowered to create new holding companies without shareholder
approval and without triggering dissenters’ rights.110 Like Delaware’s
prior laws, Ohio’s merger provisions as they existed prior to House Bill
301 required shareholder approval and provided for dissenters’ rights for
these transactions.111 This made it harder and more expensive for
corporations to enter into holding company restructuring transactions in
Ohio, placing Ohio corporations at a relative disadvantage to those in
Delaware.
House Bill 301 incorporated the substance of title 8, section 251(g)
of the Delaware Code into Ohio law through adoption of new title 17,
section 1701.802 of the Ohio Revised Code. Now, directors of Ohio
corporations can effect a holding company reorganization without
shareholder approval and without triggering dissenters’ rights, provided
that five basic requirements intended to ensure continuity of shareholder
rights are met:
(1) The parent112 company and a direct or indirect wholly owned
subsidiary are the only constituent entities in the merger;113
(2) Each outstanding share in the parent corporation before the merger
109. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.802(A) (West 2006).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) (2006).
111. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.801 (Anderson 1996).
112. “Parent” is defined in section 1701.01(P), but section 1701.802 alters the requirements of
that definition by requiring the parent to directly or indirectly own 100% of the shares of the
subsidiary, and immediately following the holding company merger, the new holding company
must directly or indirectly own 100% of the former parent.
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.802(B)(1) (West 2006). This allows the following
sequence: Company A, a public company, forms Holdco as a direct subsidiary, which in turn forms
MergerCo, a second-tier subsidiary of Company A. HoldCo contributes its own shares to
MergerCo. Company A merges with MergerCo, becoming a direct subsidiary of HoldCo.
Company A’s shares are converted into HoldCo shares, MergerCo shares are converted into
Company A shares, and HoldCo becomes Company A’s parent.
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is converted into a share in the holding company with the same
material terms;114
(3) The articles and regulations of the holding company after the
merger are not materially different from those of the parent
corporation;115
(4) As a result of the merger, the parent becomes a wholly owned
subsidiary of the holding company;116 and
(5) The parent corporation’s directors are the directors of the holding
company after the merger.117

These requirements are comparable to those that apply in Delaware.118
Lawyers who make use of new title 17, section 1701.802 of the
Ohio Revised Code will need to use judgment in determining what
changes may be made to articles and regulations of the new holding
company from those of the parent. It should be apparent that the holding
company’s articles and regulations should be able to differ in those
provisions that could have been amended by the directors of the original
corporation without shareholder approval. For example, the new holding
company should be able to have a different name unless the articles of
the original corporation prohibited them from changing its name. And if
the corporation has adopted the flexibility for director amendments to
the regulations afforded by other sections of House Bill 301, so that its
own regulations could be amended without shareholder approval, the
regulations of the new holding company should be able to differ to the
same degree. But it should be equally apparent that fundamental changes
— including changes to regulations that could not have been adopted by
the parent’s directors under the other provisions of House Bill 301 — to
the corporation would require the approval of the original corporation’s
shareholders.
D. Allowing Conversions from One Form of Entity to Another
At different stages of a business’s development, different business
entity structures present various advantages and disadvantages. As
limited liability companies have become more popular, states have
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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sought to simplify the statutory mechanisms for changing from one form
of entity to another.119 The notion of “conversion” — the metaphysical
change of one form of entity into another, without a change in the entity
itself — is the simplest approach and was adopted by Delaware in
1999.120 In the absence of a conversion statute, it was necessary to form
a new entity, and to merge the old entity into the new entity to change
the old entity into its new form.
House Bill 301 provides procedures for business entities to convert
between organizational forms. Conversions are specifically permitted for
for-profit corporations,121 limited liability companies,122 limited
partnerships,123 and partnerships.124 No changes were made to title 17,
chapter 1702 of the Ohio Revised Code, so there is no conversion
mechanism into or from a non-profit corporation.
Dissenters’ rights may apply, unless otherwise restricted, as
permitted by the statute.125 The legal consequences of conversion are the
same as what occurs in a merger or consolidation.126 Conversions are
effected by filing with the Secretary of State’s office.127
119. See, e.g., S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999). See also supra notes 12124 for Ohio Conversion Statutes.
120. S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999).
121. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.782 (West 2006) (discussing conversion from a
business entity, other than a domestic corporation or nonprofit corporation, to a domestic
corporation). See also id. § 1705.792 (discussing conversion from a domestic corporation to a
domestic or foreign business entity, other than a domestic corporation or nonprofit corporation).
122. See id. § 1705.361 (discussing conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not
a domestic limited liability company) to a domestic limited liability company). See also id. §
1705.371 (discussing conversion from a domestic limited liability company to a domestic or foreign
business entity).
123. See id. § 1782.438 (discussing conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not
a domestic limited partnership) to a domestic limited partnership). See also id. § 1782.439 (dealing
with conversion from a domestic limited partnership to a domestic or foreign business entity).
124. See id. § 1775.53 (dealing with conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not
a domestic partnership) to a domestic partnership). See also id. § 1775.54 (dealing with conversion
from a domestic partnership to a domestic or foreign business entity).
125. See id. §§ 1701.84-85 (dealing with corporations); §§ 1705.40-42 (dealing with limited
liability companies); §§1775.50-51 (dealing with partnerships); §§1782.435-437 (dealing with
limited partnerships).
126. See id. §§ 1701.821 (dealing with corporations); § 1705.391 (dealing with limited liability
companies); § 1775.56 (dealing with partnerships); § 1782.4311 (dealing with limited partnerships).
127. See id. §§ 111.16(D) (West 2006) (discussing the fee for filing and recording a certificate
of conversion) and 111.16(K)(2) (fee for creating and affixing the seal of the Secretary of State); §
1701.811 (discussing corporate conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1705.381 (discussing
limited liability company conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1775.55 (discussing
partnership conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1782.4310 (discussing limited partnership
conversion certificate filing requirement). The provisions for fees chargeable for conversions does
not become effective until April 10, 2007, but the Secretary of State’s office has committed to effect
conversions prior to that on a temporary fee schedule.
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Based on feedback received from practitioners both before and after
the effectiveness of House Bill 301, the conversion provisions will be
very useful to many smaller entities and business owners, and they are
also proving useful to larger companies that wish to convert corporate
subsidiaries into LLCs, or vice-versa.
E. Clarifying Option Grant Authority of Officers
Delaware corporate law authorizes directors to delegate to officers
the authority to grant employee stock options.128 Prior to House Bill 301,
some Ohio corporations believed that they were already authorized to
delegate option-granting authority to officers, notwithstanding statutory
language that seemed to require director action.129 But many
practitioners disagreed, believing that the statutory scheme envisions
option granting to be a fiduciary function of the directors that cannot be
delegated to non-directors. The OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee
recognized this situation and believed a statutory clarification was
desirable.130
To resolve the disagreement, House Bill 301 amends title 17,
section 1701.17 of the Ohio Revised Code to expressly authorize
directors of Ohio corporations to delegate the authority to issue
employee stock options.131 The directors must specify the total number
of shares or options the officers may issue and the terms of those shares
or options.132 The authorized officer may not designate himself or herself
as the recipient of any shares or options.133 These provisions parallel
Delaware law.134
Corporations should take special care when using these delegation
provisions, as abuse of this discretionary authority may be blamed for
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(c) (2006).
129. Title 17, section 1701.16(A) of the Ohio Revised Code states “. . .a corporation by its
directors may grant options. . .”, and section 1701.17 says “[a] corporation by its directors, . . . may
provide and carry out plans for the issuance, offering, or sale, or the grant of options . . .” (emphasis
added).
130. In its recommendation to the OSBA Council of Delegates regarding this amendment, the
Corporation Law Committee said: “Delaware General Corporation Law section 157(c) allows the
board of directors of Delaware corporations to delegate to one or more officers the authority to grant
employee stock options. It is not clear that this authority exists under the corresponding Ohio
provision. The proposed language clarifies that this authority exists.” Corporation Law Committee,
Report and Recommendations to the Ohio State Bar Association Council of Delegates Meeting 11
(Nov. 7, 2003).
131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.17(B)(1) (West 2006).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1701.17(B)(2).
134. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(c) (2006).
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some cases of “option backdating” that raise serious accounting and
legal issues.135 Compensation committees and boards of directors should
limit the scope of the delegated authority and monitor its use.
F. Clarifying the Creation and Powers of Board Subcommittees
Following the enactment by Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act136
in 2002, the demands for board-level activities to be conducted at the
committee, rather than full board, level exploded, as the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ formally required the use of committees
composed of independent directors in crucial areas such as audit,
nominating, and compensation.137 This placed tremendous pressure on
outside directors serving on those key committees, often requiring them
to greatly increase their workloads, especially on smaller boards.138 A
way around the resulting logjams was thought to be the division and
further delegation of some of the workload among the committee
members through creation of subcommittees to consider specific issues
or aspects of the committee’s role.139
This practical solution faced the problem that neither title 8 of the
Delaware Code nor title 17, section 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code
directly referred to subcommittees. Although there is probably less doubt
associated with a delegation by directors, or a committee of directors, to
a subset of their fellows than there is in the delegation of fiduciary
judgments to non-directors,140 it was still thought best to clarify the
statute. The Delaware legislature amended title 8, section 141( c)(3) of
the Delaware Code in 2003 to authorize the use of subcommittees, and
House Bill 301 followed this lead by amending title 17, section 1701.63
of the Ohio Revised Code to allow a committee to subdivide itself into
subcommittees with any or all of the committee’s power and
authority.141 This power can be limited in the articles, the regulations, or
by board resolution.142 A subcommittee may consist of one or more

135. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: SarbanesOxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2007).
136. Sabranes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
137. Ben White, Declining a Place at the Table; More Politicians, Executives Say ‘No Thanks’
to Director Seats, The WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2003, at E01.
138. Id.
139. See H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. cmt (Ohio 2005) (Committee Comments to
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (West 2006)).
140. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(3) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (West 2006).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(E) (West 2006).
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directors.143
G. Allowing SEC Reports to Serve as Notice of Board-Adopted
Amendments to the Articles
In 2002, the authority of directors to amend a corporation’s articles
of incorporation without shareholder approval was expanded.144
Historically, title 17, section 1701.70 of the Ohio Revised Code had
authorized directors to independently amend the articles of incorporation
under five circumstances; this was increased to ten circumstances by the
2002 amendments.145 At the same time, a new requirement was added to
title 17, section 1701.73 of the Ohio Revised Code, requiring notice to
be sent to shareholders within 20 days after the filing of the amendments
with the Secretary of State.146 After the 2002 amendments became law, it
was discovered by practitioners that the new notice provision had
unintended consequences: notices would be required even if the action
taken by the directors fell into one of the five historical categories, not
just one of the five new categories.147 Further, there was a potentially
high cost associated with these notices for large public companies that
have many shareholders of record. In response to these practical
concerns, House Bill 301 amended title 17, section 1701.73 of the Ohio
Revised Code to allow companies that file periodic public reports with
the SEC under sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to meet these notice provisions through those filings.148 For
corporations with a large number of shareholders, this should provide
significant future savings.

143. The decision to permit one-member subcommittees is in line with the prior 1998
amendment to title 17, section 1701.63 of the Ohio Revised Code that allowed committees to be
reduced to a single member from the prior requirement of at least three directors. As the committee
comment to the prior legislation said: “Recent changes in regulations under federal tax and
securities laws have encouraged the use of smaller committees.” In addition, the 1986 amendments
to the Ohio General Corporation Law permitting corporations to eliminate cumulative voting,
together with Ohio decisions interpreting the fiduciary duties of majority shareholders to minority
shareholders, have eliminated the need for a statute setting the size of committees.” See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.63 cmt. (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment) (reprinted in
PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, supra note 25, at 118).
144. See § 1701.70 (adopted in H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., (Ohio 2002)).
145. Id.
146. See id. § 1701.73(a).
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.73 (West 2004). For example, a corporation was required
to mail notice of the directors’ adoption of an articles amendment that eliminated references in the
articles to a class of shares that had been redeemed as allowed in title 17, section 1701.70(B)(3). Id.
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.73(A)(3) (West 2006).
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H. Broadening Permissible Consideration for Shares
In June 2004, title 8 of the Delaware Code was amended to broaden
the range of permissible consideration for the issuance of shares.149 The
Delaware revisions reflected contemporary business economics and
corporate transactional practice. These changes led the Corporation Law
Committee to analyze title 17, section 1701.18 of the Ohio Revised
Code, which governs the consideration acceptable for the payment for
shares. That provision limited the forms of payment that corporations
could accept in exchange for the issuance of shares to “money or other
property of any description, or any interest in property, actually
transferred to the corporation, or labor or services actually rendered to
the corporation.”150 These restrictions meant that shares could not be
issued in exchange for future services, as a signing bonus, or for the
prospective value of a relationship.
House Bill 301 amends title 17, section 1701.18 of the Ohio
Revised Code to allow for a much broader range of acceptable
consideration for shares. An Ohio corporation may now accept “cash,
property, services rendered, a promissory note, or any other binding
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services; the
provision of any other benefit to the corporation; or any combination of
these” as valid consideration for shares.151 The catch-all language, “any
other benefit,” is intentionally broad. Valuation of the benefit to the
corporation is left to the directors.152 Under the amended language, while
shares may now be issued in consideration of a promise to perform
services in the future, such shares remain “unpaid” until the services are
performed.153 In a parallel amendment contained in House Bill 301,
limited liability companies were authorized to also accept any of these
forms of consideration in exchange for membership interests.154
I. Recognizing Corporate Actions In Accordance With Bankruptcy
Court Orders
Both title 8 of the Delaware Code and title 17, chapter 1701 of the
Ohio Revised Code have for many years recognized that a federal
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§152, 154, 157 (2006).
150. See H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (2006) (deleting portions of section
1701.18(A)(1)).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.18(A)(1) (West 2006).
152. See id. § 1701.19(A), (B).
153. Id. § 1701.18(C).
154. See id. § 1705.09 (stating that contributions of “any benefit to the limited liability
company” suffice).
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bankruptcy court could, in a bankruptcy plan of reorganization, take
actions (for example, charter amendments or mergers) concerning a
corporation that ordinarily would require director and/or shareholder
action under non-bankruptcy conditions.155 Both title 8, section 303 of
the Delaware Code and title 17, section 1701.75 of the Ohio Revised
Code permitted companies undergoing reorganization in bankruptcy
proceedings to accomplish these actions under a plan of
reorganization.156 Such plans are adopted in reorganizations under
chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, but not in liquidations under
either that chapter or chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Also,
some preliminary corporate actions will, even in reorganizations under
chapter 11, fall outside the prior provisions of title 17, section 1701.75
of the Ohio Revised Code.157
In August 2004, title 8, section 303 of the Delaware Code was
amended to permit corporate activity under any order or decree from a
federal bankruptcy court without director or shareholder approval, thus
expanding the law’s scope to include liquidations as well as
reorganizations.158 House Bill 301 contains a parallel amendment in title
17, section 1701.75 of the Ohio Revised Code.159 This change should
reduce the problems that practitioners would face when presenting
bankruptcy court-approved documents to the Ohio Secretary of State’s
office that formerly did not appear to be authorized by chapter 1701.
J. Reliance on Certificates of Good Standing
Ohio corporate lawyers and others who worry about whether a
corporation is validly existing and in good standing at the time the
corporation undertakes a contract or engages in business have
historically faced a concern over how much reliance they could take on
the “good standing” certificates issued by Ohio’s Secretary of State.
155. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1991).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (West 2006).
157. For example, the sale of assets constituting substantially all (but not all) of the assets of
the debtor corporation could have been authorized under applicable Federal bankruptcy principles
pursuant to a order of the bankruptcy court prior to the entry of a plan of reorganization; under title
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code, this would have required the approval of the
shareholders but Federal bankruptcy procedures would have ignored this state law
requirement. Similarly, the bankruptcy court could have ordered the merger of subsidiaries into the
debtor corporation; under section 1701.80 of the Ohio Revised Code this would require approval by
directors of each corporation. The amendments to section 1701.75 eliminate these state
law requirements.
158. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (2006).
159. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (West 2006).
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Although custom and practice in corporate business transactions require
reliance by lawyers, title insurers, and others on these good standing
certificates, the reality is that a corporation’s good standing may change
in a single day, without notice to someone who received the Secretary of
State’s certification earlier that day. As a result of concerns from lawyers
who understood the potential for embarrassment, if not malpractice, for
opinions as to good standing that were given in reliance on a certificate
that was literally untrue at the moment it was relied on, House Bill 301
amends title 17, section 1701.92 of the Ohio Revised Code to define
“good standing” and to expressly allow reliance on a certificate of good
standing issued by the Secretary of State.160 The new language provides
that a person may rely on a certificate of good standing for a period of
seven days after the date on the certificate, provided that person had no
knowledge that the corporation’s articles had been canceled and the
certificate is not presented as evidence against the State.161 This makes it
easier to complete transaction closings because it provides a window of
time during which reliance on the certificate is legally justified,
eliminating the possible need for obtaining “bring-down” certificates
from the Secretary of State and the Ohio tax division.
III. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
As the chart earlier in this article shows, House Bill 301 is but one
step in the continuing evolution of Ohio corporate law.162 Many changes
have already occurred; Ohio is making good progress in “keeping up
with Delaware.” But we know that law is not static, and that more
change is ahead of us. What might these changes be? Here are some
changes that we may see in the future.
A. Majority Voting Proposals
The OSBA Council of Delegates has already approved a
recommendation by the Corporation Law Committee to support
160. House Bill 301 provides that the certificate of good standing is conclusive evidence that:
(1) a domestic corporation’s authority has not been limited under dissolution
provisions, as long as
(a) the person relying on the certificate had no knowledge that the articles had been
canceled, and
(b) the certificate is not presented as evidence against the state; and
(2) a foreign corporation’s license to transact business in Ohio has not expired, been
canceled or been surrendered.
161. See § 1701.92(D)(1).
162. See supra pp. 178-84.
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legislation to amend title 17, section 1701.55 of the Ohio Revised Code
to clearly permit Ohio corporations to amend their articles of
incorporation to provide for majority voting in the election of
directors.163 This change is necessary in order to respond to a
groundswell of shareholder activists who believe that the current
plurality standard that has been the general rule in U.S. corporate
elections undercuts “shareholder democracy” and promotes
entrenchment of management.164 This is part of a much larger national
fight to give shareholders more influence over who serves as directors of
America’s public corporations.165 While there are many who believe the
current system works well, the voting results in 2006 show that many
shareholders believe otherwise, as at least 36 shareholder proposals
seeking majority voting standards received majority support from
shareholders.166
Delaware law has historically allowed its corporations to opt in to
majority voting requirements.167 However, Delaware recently adopted a
package of legislative changes to numerous sections of title 8 of the
Delaware Code to better accommodate majority voting, for example by
allowing conditional director resignations to be effective at a later
date.168 In the author’s view, these changes are not necessary in Ohio
because existing law already permits such resignations.169
163. OHIO STATE CAR ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF DELEGATES, FALL 2006 MEETING, 10
available at http://downloads.ohiobar.org/pubs/council_files/Report_of_the_Corporation_Law_
Committee_Fa06.pdf. The suggested language would insert “Unless the articles otherwise provide,”
at the beginning of title 17, section 1701.55 of the Ohio Revised Code’s current language. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The following is an excerpt from a report from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a
leading advisor to institutional investors:
According to ISS records, shareholders filed 84 majority election proposals that came to
a vote in the first half of 2006. This compares with 54 proposals that came to a vote in
the first six months of 2005, and 12 in 2004. For the first half of 2006, shareholder
support for these majority vote proposals averaged 47.7 percent (compared with 44.3
percent during the first half of 2005). And by August 2006, 36 proposals had received
more than 50 percent support, nearly triple the number in 2005. In 2004, these proposals
averaged less than 12 percent of votes in favor, without a single proposal winning a
majority.
ISS Governance Center, Governance Weekly, http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/
2007archived/005.jsp (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
167. See S.B. 322, 143rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2006).
168. Id. at § 3 (amending 8 DEL ALS § 141(b)).
169. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.58(A) (West 2006) (“A resignation shall take effect
immediately or at such other time as the director may specify.”). The use of the word “time,” rather
than “date” as previously used in title 8 of the Delaware Code and the MBCA, allows the director to
fix a set of conditions upon which the resignation becomes effective. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
223(d) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.07(b) (2006).
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The author expects that the majority voting amendment would
become part of a legislative proposal this year.
B. Responding to Hollinger Dicta
In Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc.,170 Vice Chancellor
Strine’s opinion contained dicta that caused concern to Delaware
lawyers regarding the application of Delaware’s “sale of all or
substantially all” statutes, title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, in
holding company situations.171 Thus, the question: Are sales of assets
held by subsidiaries covered by the statute, or only assets held directly
by the corporation? Conversely, are sales of assets to wholly-owned
subsidiaries subject to title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, or not?
In 2006, Delaware responded to these concerns with legislation that
amended title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code to clarify that the
statute indeed covers assets held by direct and indirect wholly-owned
subsidiaries, and that sales to subsidiaries are not covered by the
statute.172
Ohio’s analog to title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, as
previously discussed in connection with House Bill 301, is title 17,
section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code.173 The Corporation Law
Committee has recently approved proposed language that would, if
approved by the OSBA Council of Delegates, be part of a future
legislative package.174 The language generally adopts the Delaware
approach. In the author’s view, this would not be a change from current
interpretations of Ohio law, but the changes would remove any doubt
and assist in advising clients.
C. Eliminating the Opt-Out Waiting Period for Cumulative Voting
In 1986, Ohio reversed its historic requirement that corporations
must permit cumulative voting in the election of directors, allowing
170. 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004).
171. Id. at 373.
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 171 (2006).
173. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2006).
174. The Committee Comment is as follows:
This amendment clarifies that (1) the “sale of all or substantially all assets” provision
under ORC §1701.76 applies to sales of assets whether owned directly by a corporation
or owned indirectly through one or more layers of wholly owned entities, and (2) the
section does not apply to downstream movement of assets from a corporation to its to
wholly-owned subsidiary entities.
Id. (Corporation Law Committee Comments, approved 2006).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss1/5

30

Porter: Ohio's Changing Corporation Laws
PORTERFINAL.DOC

2007]

3/19/2007 12:23:14 PM

OHIO’S CHANGING CORPORATION LAWS

205

corporations to opt out of that requirement by amending their articles of
incorporation.175 When those amendments were adopted, it was thought
too radical to allow newly formed corporations to immediately opt out of
cumulative voting, and instead a 90 day waiting period was imposed.176
The Corporation Law Committee recently concluded that the waiting
period is no longer desirable and has recommended that the waiting
period be eliminated.177 The author anticipates that this would be
combined with the amendment described above to title 17, section
1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code for consideration by the OSBA
Council of Delegates and, if approved, be part of a future legislative
package.
D. And There Will be More!
The OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee is constantly looking to
improve Ohio’s entity statutes. Ideas for change flow in from
practitioners around the state. Some die an early death, others move
quickly into legislation, while yet others percolate through the
Committee’s processes for years. No one can predict precisely what
future changes will be. What is certain is that there will be changes. Who
knows, someday we may accomplish my own pet project: the
elimination of stated capital as a statutory concept!178

175. See §§ 1701.04 (discussing the contents of articles of incorporation) and 1701.69
(discussing the amendments to articles).
176. Id. § 1701.04(E).
177. See supra, note 174.
178. See, for example, the use of stated capital in §§ 1701.30, 1701.31, 1701.32, 1701.34 and
1701.35. Bayless Manning asked the questions:
Does the present day statutory legal capital machinery made up of par value, stated
capital, and related non-economic concepts – controlled as it is by the shareholders,
directors and their lawyers and accountants – effectively perform any significant relevant
function in protecting creditors of corporations? . . .Is anything more needed than the
Massachusetts provision forbidding a distribution to shareholders if the company is
insolvent or if it would be rendered insolvent by the distribution?
BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 108 (New York, Foundation Press
1971). His answer to each of these questions: “No.” Id. Stay tuned.
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